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I. INTRODUCTION
The economies of Canada and the United States and the
organization of their societies are deeply interrelated but significant
differences exist. In terms of labor law and collective bargaining,
Professor Marco Biagi described a North American model' characterized
mainly by workers' electoral selection of unionization based on the
principle of exclusive representation.2 Once certified as the majority
representative, a union enjoys a monopoly in representing employees in
the relevant bargaining unit.3 Biagi noted, however, that the
* This essay was presented by the authors on March 19, 2012 in Modena, Italy at the Tenth
Annual Comparative Labour Law Conference in Commemoration of Marco Biagi. The authors
thank their colleagues at the University of Modena's Marco Biagi Foundation for their hospitality.
An Italian version of the essay is forthcoming in RULES, POLICIES AND METHOD: THE LEGACY OF
MARCO BIAGI IN LABOUR RELATIONS TODAY (Alberto Russo & lacopo Sentori, eds., 2012).
** Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago.
*** Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
1. Professor Biagi was describing the labor relations systems of the United States and
Canada as comprising the North American model. He did not include within his analysis the most
southern of the North American countries - Mexico.
2. MARCO BIAGI, Forms of Employee Representational Participation, in MARCO BIAGI:
SELECTED WRITINGS 191, 193-95 (Michele Tiraboschi, ed., 2003) [hereinafter Forms of
Participation].
3. See id. He characterized the U.S. and Canadian approaches as "a model of selection of
trade union representation based on an electoral procedure, where a trade union is recognised as the
exclusive agent on the basis of majority principle." Id. at 193-94. He then described the exclusive
bargaining status of a union as "a monopoly of representation." Id. at 195. But further, he attributes
the low union density of union representation in the U.S. private sector- then less than 20 percent,
now less than 7 percent - to its "anti-union managerial culture." Id. Finally, he noted that proposals
to amend the National Labor Relations Act to establish alternative models of labor-management
1
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"differentiating features" of the Canadian and U.S. systems should not
be disregarded.4 One distinctive characteristic in Canada, for example,
is the use in some provinces of non-electoral "membership evidence" to
demonstrate legal majority status, a mechanism favored by unions.
This particular differentiating feature, among others, was at the heart of
recent debates about U.S. labor law reform,6 and the extent to which the
Canadian experience should serve for U.S. policymakers as an example
to follow or a cautionary tale.
In exploring the interplay between the Canadian and U.S. systems,
this essay will briefly trace the interaction between the two countries in
the development of labor relations laws with a particular emphasis on
the impact of scholarly work on U.S. labor law reform debates in the last
two decades. Instructive for that purpose is the work of Professor Paul
Weiler, a prominent figure in labor law policy discussions in both
countries. A significant architect of labor law in Canada, Weiler came to
Harvard Law School in 19787 and brought his experience and insights
with him, rapidly becoming one of the foremost labor law scholars in the
United States.8 His influence in the 1990s, and hence the influence of
Canadian ideas, on the ultimately unsuccessful labor law reform
proposals of President Clinton's Dunlop Commission is detailed below.
Professor Weiler's proposals are once again the basis for scholarly
and policy debate. This time, however, Canadian ideas and experience
have prompted a scholarly border skirmish. Recently, when new
relations such as "employee consultation committees" that act independently of unions had not
received much support even though employers, with union opposition, appeared to favor them. Id
Professor Biagi's chapter first appeared as Marco Biagi, Forms of Employee Representational
Participation, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED
MARKET ECONOMIES 483 (Roger Blainpain, Chris Engels & Greg Bamber eds., 2001). The chapter
appears in updated form as Marco Biagi & Michele Tiraboschi, Forms of Employee
Representational Participation, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 523 (Roger Blanpain ed. 2010).
4. Forms ofParticipation, supra note 2, at 194.
5. Id. at 195.
6. See Examining Rebuilding Economic Security, Focusing on Empowering Workers to
Restore the Middle Class: Hearing Before the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, I 11th
Cong. 4-5 (2009) (statement of Sen. John Isakson, Member, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and
Pensions); id at 7 (statement of Sen. Robert Casey, Member, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor,
and Pensions).
7. See Alan F. J. Artibise, "A Worthy, if Unlikely Enterprise ": The Labour Relations Board
and the Evolution of Labour Policy and Practice in British Colombia, 1973-1980, 56 B.C. STUD.
3,10 n.24 (1982) ("Weiler served as chairman of the [Labour Relations Board] from 1973-1978. He
left the Board to accept [a] position . . .at Harvard Law School.").
8. See John Trumpbour, The Crisis in Workplace Governance: Special Issue in Honor of
Paul C Weiler, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y. J. 93, 93 (2007).
2 [Vol. 30:1
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legislation - the Employee Free Choice Act - was proposed to Congress
to implement a number of reforms to the National Labor Relations Act
based on the Canadian experience, one U.S. researcher produced a study
arguing that the actual Canadian experience where these reforms were in
place resulted in higher unemployment and slower economic growth.9
Her conclusions were widely reported in the press and disseminated by
opponents of the proposed legislation.10 The reaction from Canada was
swift. Canadian labor scholars, fearing the corrosive effects of such
critiques on their own labor relations regime, responded with rejoinders
challenging and critiquing the work of this American scholar."
Clearly, and notwithstanding American provincialism, Canadian-
influenced labor law scholarship has played a central role in U.S. policy
debates, creating a favorable intellectual environment for labor law
convergence. Yet the opponents of U.S. labor law reform also deploy
scholarship aimed at the Canadian experience in order to reinforce the
divergent paths of the two systems, as do Canadian scholars acting
defensively to forestall greater convergence of the Canadian regime to
the U.S. model.12
II. PRE-WAGNER ACT LABOR LAW OF THE U.S. AND CANADA
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, common law was the
source for the regulation of labor-management disputes in both Canada
and the United States. 1 3  In the United States, the enactment of the
9. See Anne Layne-Farrar, An Empirical Assessment of the Employee Free Choice Act: The
Economic Implications 3-4 (March 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1353305.
10. See, e.g., Norene Pupo, Introduction, 15 JUST LAB.: CANADIAN J. OF WORK AND SOC'Y
(SPECIAL EDITION) 1, 1-2 (2009), available at
http://www.justlabour.yorku.ca/volumel5/pdfs/01_pupo-press.pdf
11. See, e.g. id. at 2; Susan Johnson, Comments on "An Empirical Assessment of the
Employee Choice Act: The Economic Implications" by Anne Layne-Farrar, 15 JUST LAB.:
CANADIAN J. OF WORK AND SOc'Y (SPECIAL EDITION) 14, 15 (2009), available at
http://www.justlabour.yorku.ca/volumel5/pdfs/03johnsonpress.pdf; Open Statement by Canadian
Scholars on Unionization and Free Economic and Social Well-Being of Canadians (Nov. 2009), 15
JUST LAB.: CANADIAN J. OF WORK AND SOC'Y (SPECIAL EDITION) 4, 4-5 (2009), available at
http://www.justlabour.yorku.ca/volumel5/pdfs/02_open letterpress.pdf [hereinafter Open
Statement by Canadian Scholars].
12. Open Statement by Canadian Scholars, supra note 11, at 4-5.
13. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique ofthe New
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983); Eric Tucker, "Great Expectations"
Defeated?: The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Regimes in Canada and the United States Post-
NAFTA, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 134, 145 (2004). Civil law, however, applied in Quebec
in Canada and in Louisiana in the United States. See E. Fabre-Surveyer, The Civil Law in Quebec
2012]1 3
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Sherman Antitrust Act of 189014 moved the legal regulation of union
activity from state courts and common law to the federal courts and to
federal statutory law.15 While supposedly aimed at business trusts, the
Sherman Act's prohibition of "combinations in restraint of trade"
became the basis for federal courts to issue injunctions against industrial
actions by unions and their members. 16 This began a long era in which
the primary legislative goal of the union movement in the United States
was to free unions and their members from these labor injunctions."
Following the 1906 Lethbridge coalfield strike, the Dominion
Parliament in Canada adopted the Canadian Industrial Disputes
Investigation Act of 1907.18 Its goal aligned with the way the Sherman
Act had been applied in the United States by providing for injunctions in
labor disputes.' 9 This Act, which applied to all employment in Canada,
replaced the common law with an administrative law regime but one
quite different from what labor law enforcement would become in both
Canada and the United States.2 0 The employer, "any of his employees,"
or the Minister of Labour for the Dominion could seek the appointment
of a Board of Conciliation and Investigation to intervene in any
"industrial dispute."21 The application had to include a declaration that,
failing adjustment, a lockout or a strike would probably occur.22 Once a
dispute was referred to a Board, it was unlawful for the employer to
lockout or for the employees to strike on account of the dispute with
* * 23those activities subject to an injunction.
and Louisiana, 1 LA. L. REV. 649, 649 (1939).
14. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
15. However, § 1 of the Sherman Act channeled the common law concerning combinations
in restraint of trade. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." Id. at §1; See, e.g., Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [1911-13] All E.R. Rep.
400, 403-04 (Eng.).
16. One of the earliest invocations of the Act was in 1894, against the American Railway
Union led by Eugene V. Debs, with the intent to settle the Pullman Strike. See J. ANTHONY LUKAS,
BIG TROUBLE: A MURDER IN A SMALL WESTERN TOwN SETS OFF A STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF
AMERICA 310-12 (1997). Several years would pass before the Act was first used against its intended
perpetrator, corporate monopolies. See id. at 390.
17. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 17-19, 21, 24-25
(1930).
18. 6 & 7 Edw. 7 c. 20 (Can.).
19. Compare Industrial Dispute Investigation Act arts. 56-6 1, with Sherman Antitrust Act §4.
20. Compare Industrial Dispute Investigation Act, c. 20, with National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§151-169 (2006).
21. Industrial Dispute Investigation Act art. 5
22. Industrial Dispute Investigation Act art. 15
23. Industrial Dispute Investigation Act arts. 56, 63
4 [Vol. 30:1
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The next step24 was in 1925 when the Privy Council found that the
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act violated the British North America
Act of 186725 because the authority to regulate labor management
relations was, with certain exceptions, in the provinces, not the national
government.26 In Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider,27 the Privy
Council found that section 91 of the Dominion Act gave the Dominion
Parliament "a general power to make laws for Canada. But these law are
not to relate to the classes of subjects assigned to the Provinces by s. 92,
unless their enactment falls under heads specifically assigned to the
Dominion Parliament by the enumeration in s. 91.",28 Since the
challenged Act was "concerned directly with the civil rights of both
employers and employed," 29 the exclusive authority to legislate on those
rights was in the provinces. The national legislation was not saved
because it was not within the authority of the national government to
legislate in the area of criminal law, its power to regulate trade and
commerce or to make laws "for the peace, order and good government
of Canada in matters falling outside the provincial powers [were]
specifically conferred by s. 92."so So, labor law was essentially within
the domain of the provinces, thus foreclosing the exercise of national
power, except as to a limited range of activities such as navigation,
shipping, railways, canals, telegraphs, air transportation and radio
broadcasting.31 This decision returned jurisdiction over labor-
management relations and labor disputes to the provinces and to the
common law.32 About 90 percent of the private sector workers were
subject to provincial labor law.33
24. In the U.S., the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, enacted
October 15, 1914, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53), attempted to
get federal courts out of the business of issuing injunctions in labor disputes but the courts
nevertheless found ways to circumvent that restriction. See FRANKFURTER & GREEN, supra note 17,
at 165-66.
25. This Act is still viewed by most Canadian as their core constitutional document. See
Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Protection ofIndividual Rights in Canada: The Impact of the New
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedom, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1191, 1193-94 (1984).
26. See Toronto Electric Com'rs v. Snider, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5, 5-6 (Can.)
27. [1925] 2. D.L.R. 5 (Can.).
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id at 14.
31. See id. at 15, 18 (holding that the power to govern labor laws was reserved for the
provinces).
32. See id.
33. See id; See Kris Warner, Protecting Fundamental Labor Rights: Lessons from Canada
for the United States, CTR. FOR ECON & POL'Y RESEACH 5 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/canada-2012-08.pdf.
2012] 5
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In 1932, the union movement in the United States, with the
enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 34 , achieved what had been its
primary legislative goal of freeing labor disputes and industrial action
from the antitrust laws.35
III. CONVERGENCE COMMENCES: THE WAGNER ACT MODEL
Given the dramatic impact of the Great Depression and the rise of
industrial unionism, labor's legislative goal in the U.S shifted from
seeking deregulation to governmental assistance through law. That goal
was achieved with the enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935,36 the first
of three pieces of legislation commonly known as that National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)." With section 7 guaranteeing the right of
38
workers to organize for collective bargaining, section 8 providing
protections of those rights,39 and section 9 providing the administrative
mechanism for unions to achieve exclusive bargaining status for workers
of a particular employer at a particular workplace,4 0 the model for labor
law that continues in the United States and Canada was established.
Instead of attempting to regulate strikes and lockouts through the use of
injunctions, a purpose of the Wagner model was to reduce industrial
action by the promotion and protection of collective bargaining.41
34. Ch. 90,47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2006)).
35. See id
36. Wagner Act, Pub.L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (2006)).
37. The Wagner Act model was subsequently modified by two major pieces of legislation.
The Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 shifted the focus of the law from protecting the right of
workers to organize to protecting the choice of workers whether or not to organize. See Taft-Hartley
Act, Pub.L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2006)).
The Landrum-Griffin amendments in 1959 were primarily directed at the protection of members of
unions vis-A-vis their unions, including a workers Bill of Rights. See Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006)). The Act is
now known as the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
38. WagnerAct§7.
39. See id § 8.
40. See id. § 9.
41. Section 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151, sets out a principal purpose of the Act, which is to reduce
strikes by providing a method for the legally imposed recognition of unions by employers:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other
forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation
of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c)
materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured
or processed goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such
[Vol. 30:16
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During World War II, the labor laws enacted by the Canadian
provinces, including some loosely based on the Wagner Act, failed
because they did not mandate that employers bargain with unions
representing a majority of their workers.42 With the failure of effective
collective bargaining, Canada suffered massive strikes. 43  In 1944, the
national government, acting on its emergency powers, suspended
provincial labor legislation." To supplant those provincial laws, the
national government issued Wartime Labor Relations Regulations, Order
in Council 1003 (P.C. 1003), which more closely followed the Wagner
Act model.45 P.C. 1003 mandated the duty to meet and bargain in good
faith, prohibited unfair labor practices, and introduced a labour relations
board, the National War Labour Relations Board, to enforce the law. 46 it
did, however, maintain several traditional Canadian labor principles that
differed from the Wagner Act. The major differences were that the
arbitration of rights grievances arising from a collective bargaining
agreement was mandatory and that strikes and lockouts were forbidden
during the term of an agreement.47
In 1948, the provisions of P.C. 1003 were consolidated into and
became part of the Canadian Labour Code.48 With the lifting of the
emergency, the provinces followed the lead of P.C 1003 and enacted
legislation more closely channeling the Wagner Act model. While there
is some difference among the Canadian Labour Code and the provincial
labor laws, they all have certain features that they share with the
NLRA. 4 9 They include protection for employee freedom of association,
materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in
such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or
into the channels of commerce.
42. Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Pluralism or Fragmentation? The Twentieth-Century
Employment Law Regime in Canada, 46 LABOuR/LE TRAVAIL 251, 271-72 (2000).
43. See id at 274-75.
44. H.A. Logan, The State of Collective Bargaining, 10 CANADIAN J. OF ECON. & POL. SC.
476, 476, 486 (1944).
45. See Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, The Legacy of PC 1003, 3 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 357, 358 (1994-95); Logan, supra note 44, at 486.
46. See Logan, supra note 44, at 476.
47. Fudge & Glasbeek, supra note 45, at 364.
48. See Charles W. Smith, The Politics of the Ontario Labour-Relations Act: Business,
Labour, and Government in the Consolidation of Post- War Industrial Relations, 1949-1961, 62
LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 109, 111 (2008) (stating that Privy Council Order 1003 was passed in 1944
and was codified in the 1948 Industrial Disputes Investigations Act).
49. As noted above, Professor Marco Biagi characterized the North American model as based
on selection of trade union representation through an election by the majority of workers and the
maintenance thereafter of exclusive bargaining status, which he describes as "a monopoly of
representation." See Forms ofParticipation, supra note 2, at 193-95.
2012] 7
HeinOnline  -- 30 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 7 2012
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL
mandated recognition by employers of unions that represent a majority
of its workers in a particular bargaining unit, compulsory bargaining
rights for certified and lawfully recognized unions, prohibition of unfair
labor practices by employers and unions, and the establishment of
industrial relations boards with authority to investigate and resolve
issues arising under these laws.o
IV. CANADIAN TINKERING WITH THE WAGNER MODEL
Canadian labor codes all share certain features that are not included
in the basic structure of the Wagner Act in the United States. Those
features include postponement of the right to strike until conciliation
fails and mandatory grievance arbitration to resolve disputes arising
during the term of the collective agreement without resorting to a
strike.5 ' There are also some important differences among these
different labor laws. Because labor law jurisdiction is divided between
the national government and the ten provinces, labor law has been at
issue in numerous elections and is "sensitive to sub-national swings in
political strength and hence labor law reform has been more volatile."52
On the issue of card-check certification, Professor Michael Lynk
describes the shifts in less than twenty-five years as to whether or not to
provide for card-check certification:
Prior to 1984, the federal jurisdiction and nine of the ten provinces
utilized the card-check system in their labour legislation. Since 1984,
five provinces have set aside the card-check system and turned to the
mandatory secret ballot process: British Columbia (which adopted the
mandatory certification election process in 1984; reverted to the card-
check process in 1992, and returned to mandatory elections in 2002);
Alberta (1988); Newfoundland (1994); Ontario (1995); and
Saskatchewan (2008).53
50. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 157-158 (2006).
51. In the United States, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, which was created
by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, replaced the United States Conciliation Service in providing
voluntary mediation and conciliation services. See Louis Stark, Analysis of Labor Act Shows
Changed Era at Hand for Industry, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1947, at 1.
52. Tucker, supra note 13, at 149. Since 1982, the federal and provincial governments have
enacted 198 labor laws, with 189 restricting, suspending or denying collective bargaining rights of
workers. Derek Fudge, Remarks at the Freedom of Association Conference 1 (Feb. 2010) (transcript
available upon request to author).
53. Michael Lynk, Labour Law and the New Inequality, 15 JUST LAB.: CANADIAN J. WORK
& Soc'v (SPECIAL EDITION) 125, 135 (2009).
8 [Vol. 30:1
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As of 2011, seven of the Canadian provinces provide for first
contract arbitration.54  Unlike card-check certification, that feature of
Canadian labor law has been much less in issue politically since 1984.5
V. PAUL WEILER'S CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
As Canadian labor law has evolved, developed, and diverged from
the Wagner model, Canadian innovations seeped south across the border
and significantly influenced U.S. labor law scholarly and policy debates.
While none of these ideas resulted in actual changes to U.S. labor law,
they can be traced into concrete law reform proposals. One man in
particular - Harvard Law School Professor Emeritus Paul Weiler - is
greatly responsible for the impact of Canadian legal thinking on U.S.
scholarly and policymaking circles.56 Weiler's legal theorizing is
connected directly to his experiences in Canada.
Professor Weiler's career in the Canadian legal academy began in
1965 at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University in Toronto, which
is the school from which he received his LLB.57  He also served as a
labor arbitrator in those early years.ss In 1973, Weiler was asked to help
draft proposed labor legislation in British Columbia.59  More
specifically, he was asked to write the section that defined the provincial
Labour Relations Board.60 That legislation, described by one scholar as
"undoubtedly the most innovative labour law in Canada," became
British Columbia's Labour Code.6 1 Weiler was a "principal architect[]"
of this "groundbreaking" legislation, and served for five years from
54. John Logan, Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining: How Does the United States
Compare With Other Democracies?, LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS'N,
http://leraweb.org/publications/perspectives-online-companion/union-recognition-and-collective-
bargaining-how-does-unit (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
55. DOUGLAS G. GILBERT, BRIAN W. BURKETT & MOIRA K. MCCASKILL, CANADIAN
LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE U.S. PRACTITIONER, 713-15 tbl.B (3d. ed. 2011).
56. Canadian labor law scholars are much more familiar with United States law and
scholarship than U.S. academics are of Canadian labor law and scholarship. Many of Canada's top
labor law scholars have earned LL.M. and/or S.J.D. degrees at U.S. law schools. Paul Weiler has
noted the great impact that renowned U.S. labor law scholar Archibald Cox had on him when
Weiler was studying for an LL.M. at Harvard Law School. See Paul C. Weiler, Acceptance Speech
of the Bora Laskin Award, (May 5, 2005). Weiler also notes that many Canadians had similar
experiences, including Professor Harry Arthurs, who was Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School when
Weiler began his academic career. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Artibise, supra note 7, at 10.
60. Id
61. Id.
2012] 9
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1973-1978 as the first chairman of British Columbia's Labour Relations
Board (LRB).62 He describes his term on the LRB as "crucial real world
experience for my teaching and writing."
Among the notable aspects of the LRB's powers were two aimed at
discouraging tactics used by employers to avoid unionization, conduct
which had proven resistant to cease and desist orders. The first allowed
the LRB not only to reinstate employees illegally dismissed during
union organizing campaigns but also to certify a union where employer
unfair labor practices prevent the LRB from ascertaining the employees'
true wishes.M The second allowed the LRB to impose a first collective
bargaining agreement on the parties where they were unsuccessful in
bargaining on their own. 65  British Columbian innovations regarding
certification procedure and first contract attainment also played a central
role in Weiler's scholarly work soon after he left the LRB and joined the
U.S. legal academy.
In 1978, Weiler accepted a position at Harvard Law School as
Mackenzie King Professor of Canadian Studies.66 The book he wrote
during that time, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian
Labour Law,67 explores the shape the government's industrial relations
policy should take. Weiler examines this central question through his
experience with the British Columbian law that he was so instrumental
in administering during its formative period.69 Part of what makes the
book so interesting is that he very successfully intertwines politics with
labor policy and labor law.
62. Harry Arthurs, Reconciling Diferences Differently: Reflections on Labor Law and
Worker Voice After Collective Bargaining, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 155, 156 n.3 (2007).
63. Weiler, supra note 56.
64. Artibise, supra note 7, at 17-18. Presently, this power is codified in section 14(4)(f) of
the British Columbia Labour Relations Code. British Columbia Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 244, §14 (B.C.). This approach appears to be a Canadian codification inspired by the
principle announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969). In Gissel, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Board may issue a bargaining
order in a case where a majority of employees sign union authorization cards, and the employer
rejects those cards while committing significant unfair labor practices that make a fair election
unlikely. See id. at 599-600.
65. See Artibise, supra note 7, at 18. The present British Columbia Labour Relations Code
provision on this issue is codified in section 55. R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244, § 55 (B.C.).
66. See supra note 7.
67. PAUL C. WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CANADIAN
LABOUR LAW (1980) [hereinafter RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES].
68. See id. at v-vii (explaining that the focus of the book is on "the analysis and appraisal of
the basic policy themes themselves.").
69. See id. at vi (detailing his experience "grappling with ... British Columbia labour
relations.").
10 [Vol. 30:1
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While Weiler describes a wide range of developments in labor law
during his chairmanship, this article will focus on two important issues -
card-check certification and first contract arbitration. As to card check
certification, he makes an extended analysis of the pluses and minuses of
it versus a mandatory election, including elections with very short
electioneering periods, and comes out in favor of card-check, the
approach that British Columbia adopted when he chaired its Board:
Trade unions should be granted certification - that legal license to
bargain - on the basis of signed membership cards. The real test of
whether employee support will remain steadfast will come when the
trade union looks for a mandate to support its efforts at the bargaining
table. In the meantime, the Canadian model of representation law does
a much better job than its American counterpart of performing the task
we should set for it: encouraging collective bargaining through trade
unions freely and peacefully chosen by the employees.
Weiler starts his discussion of first-contract arbitration by laying
out the underpinnings of collective bargaining that, ultimately, rely on
the use of economic weapons to drive the parties to agreement.71 He
then discusses some of his experiences while on the Board that, in his
72
view, justified first contract arbitration. In what may seem surprising,
he found that where the Board used first-contract arbitration, the
"collective bargaining relationships did not mature."73 Yet, he concluded
that
first-contract arbitration was a great success in its broader preventive
impact. We imposed very few agreements.... But when we did write
agreements against an anti-union employer, we made the compensation
package rather generous. We stated quite forthrightly that that was
what we were doing, in order to provide a disincentive to other
employers adopting the kinds of tactics which would get them before
the Labour Board.
Weiler's real influence on the U.S. scene, however, began after he
70. Id. at 48-49.
71. See id. at 49 ("The assumption of our system is that when they do reach ... an impasse,
an economic test of strength must take place to break the logjam. It is the strike that determines
which side will find it more painful to disagree, which party will be forced to make the major moves
toward compromise.").
72. See id at 49-53.
73. Id. at 54.
74. Id.
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became a member of the Harvard Law School faculty in 1979. During
his first five years on faculty, he published two articles in the Harvard
Law Review that had an extraordinary impact on U.S. labor law
scholarship. The two articles, Promises to Keep7 and Striking a New
Balance, forcefully advocated U.S. labor law reform by drawing from
the Canadian experience.
VI. THE IMPACT OF CANADIAN THINKING ON U.S. LABOR LAW
SCHOLARSHIP
In Promises to Keep, Weiler proposed Canadian-inspired reform of
what he characterized as U.S. labor law's weak regulatory framework in
order to circumvent "skyrocketing use of coercive and illegal tactics . . .
by employers determined to prevent the unionization of their
employees."7 8 Weiler traced the precipitous decline in union density in
the U.S. to the NLRA's representation procedure, which allows for
lengthy, fiercely contested election campaigns, periods during which
employers may not only make their antipathy toward unions clear to
their employees but also commit unfair labor practices, such as
discriminatory discharges. 79 Employers engage in the latter conduct, he
argued, in order to scuttle the union's momentum during an organizing
drive.o
The remedial structure of the NLRA, however, which relies on
backpay awards and reinstatement, fails to deter such unlawful actions.
This is due to the small size of back pay awards, which are subject to an
employee duty to mitigate damages,8' and the difficulty regulators have
in repairing and restoring a badly damaged employment relationship, a
prerequisite for effective restatement.82 Nor do so-called Gissel
bargaining orders, which require employer bargaining where employer
unfair labor practices are so egregious that a fair election is unlikely,
75. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter Promises].
76. Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union
Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1984) [hereinafter New Balance].
77. Alan Hyde, Endangered Species, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 456 (1991) (reviewing PAUL C.
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990)).
78. Promises, supra note 75, at 1769-70.
79. See id at 1773-74, 1778-79, 1781-82.
80. Id. at 1788.
81. Id. at 1789.
82. Id. at 1791.
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supply needed deterrence. Even where such orders are granted, they
can do no more than provide an opportunity to force the employer to the
table. The union, which in such cases may be greatly weakened by the
illegal actions of the employer, is often hard-pressed to ask employees to
strike in support of its bargaining demands, making attainment of a first
contract a long shot.84
Weiler argued that the weakness in the U.S. system was the
assumption that there should be a campaign waged by the union and the
employer prior to a secret ballot election.85 Such a contest, he noted,
provides the employer with time to erode the union's support and an
incentive to behave illegally.86 The solution was to be found in either
one of two Canadian practices: certification of the union upon the
presentation of signed authorization cards by a majority of the
employees, or the holding of an instant election when the union presents
enough authorization cards to indicate "substantial employee interest."87
Although Weiler noted that card check certification was the system over
which he presided in British Columbia and was superior to the U.S.
approach, he ultimately endorsed the system of instant elections
embraced by the Canadian province of Nova Scotia because such a
proceeding can confirm in the minds of all parties the status of the union
and confer legitimacy upon it."
In Striking a New Balance, Weiler explored the difficulty for newly
certified unions of negotiating a first contract and the contribution of
U.S. labor law to that phenomenon, which he opined had led to the
overall decline in union density.89 One causal factor is the very narrow
statutory requirement of the duty to bargain, which requires the parties to
negotiate in good faith yet does not mandate that either party agree or
make concessions.90 Moreover, the remedies for bad faith bargaining do
not include imposing an agreement on the violator.91 Rather, the most
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) can do is to order
compliance with the law in the future.9 2 Without enforcement power of
its own, if the NLRB hopes to impose contempt proceedings on a party
83. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
84. Promises, supra note 75, at 1794-95.
85. See id at 1805.
86. Id. at 1805.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 1811-12.
89. See generally New Balance, supra note 76.
90. See id. at 358-59.
91. Id. at 360.
92. See Id.
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that continues to flout the law, it must apply to a federal court of appeals
for enforcement.9 9 Finally, the employees' power of self-help is limited
under the NLRA.94 Secondary boycotts, actions taken by a union to
pressure other companies to cease doing business with the employer, are
subject to a broad statutory prohibition." Additionally, while a strike
may exert pressure on their employer to agree to their demands, where
the drive for unionization has been protracted and traumatic, the
employees may be reluctant to walk off the job. Striking workers may
be permanently replaced, a legal entitlement that undermines incentives
for the employer to compromise at the bargaining table.97 In fact, by
replacing the strikers, the employer may act upon the "golden
opportunity to rid itself of the union altogether."98
In considering possible reforms, Weiler once again recommended
turning to Canadian practices. He suggested first-contract arbitration as
a remedial measure for flagrant instances of bad faith bargaining.99 Yet
he acknowledged the limitations of imposing a contract on the parties:
[T]here is no guarantee . . . that the imposed contract will have a real
bearing on life at the plant or that it will be renewed. My own
experience in administering the first statute containing such a remedy
persuades me that if the agreement is to have any chance of enduring,
the bargaining unit must be large and must display a strong initial
degree of union support. More specifically, the union's support must
be strong enough that when the contract is finally arbitrated, the
bargaining unit will still have a solid core of union activists - people
who remember the struggle ... and who will take responsibility for
administering its terms and demonstrating the advantages of collective
action.100
Weiler's suggestion for altering the MacKay Radio doctrine, named
for U.S. Supreme Court decision that announced in dicta that strikers
could be permanently replaced,1o' also considered Canadian practice. At
93. See id. at 360-61.
94. See generally id. at 361-62 (outlining the limits of employee self-help in the context of a
strike).
95. Id. at 398; See also National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(2006).
96. See New Balance, supra note 76, at 362.
97. See id
98. Id.
99. See id. at 405.
100. Id.at410-11.
101. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
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the time he was writing, a pro-labor, social democratic government in
Qu6bec had recently passed a law allowing only a skeleton crew
comprised of managers to continue operating during a strike.10 2
Although Weiler ultimately concluded this development went too
far, 03discussing the actions of a Canadian province in a Harvard Law
Review article on U.S. labor law was novel, to say the least.
Indeed, the impact of this Canadian lawyer's scholarly work on
U.S. labor law scholarship was significant. Professor Alan Hyde
describes Weiler as having "burst onto the United States labor law scene
in the early 1980s with a pair of remarkable articles."'1 Hyde notes that
the Canadian experience had until that point been "unexplored by United
States scholars."10 Dr. John Trumpbour, director of Harvard Law
School's Labor and Worklife Program, called the impact of Weiler's two
articles "crucial." 0 6 Notably, Weiler's influence transcended the Ivory
Tower. 10 7 Trumpbour recounts a 2006 speech by John Hiatt, the AFL-
CIO's chief counsel, during which Hiatt asserted that Weiler's two
articles "framed the debate about our labor laws that continues today." 08
In 1990, Weiler published Governing the Workplace: The Future of
Labor and Employment Law,' 09 which built on his earlier work but also
recommended reforms based on European practice. In particular, Weiler
recommended reforming the NLRA to require the establishment of
employee participation committees based on the German model of co-
determination." 0 To accomplish this goal, he suggested easing section
8(a)(2)'s apparent ban on employer-sponsored employee involvement
programs. 1
The book's most Canadian-influenced proposals, however, are
those related to instant elections, first-contract arbitration, and striker
replacement. Regarding instant elections, Weiler argued for his
strategy's viability based directly on the Canadian experience.112
Despite similarities in "[t]he unions, the employers, the attitudes of the
102. New Balance, supra, note 76, at 412-13.
103. See id. at 414.
104. Hyde, supra note 77, at 456.
105. Id.
106. Trumpbour, supra note 8, at 93.
107. See H.W. Arthurs, National Tradition in Labor Law and Scholarship: The Canadian
Case, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 645, 663-64, 675-76 (2002).
108. Trumpbour, supra note 8, at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. PAUL. C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990) [hereinafter GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE].
110. See id. at 283-85.
111. See id at 217.
112. Seeid at 254-55.
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work force, and the legal and collective bargaining systems," Canada has
a much higher union certification success rate and a much lower rate of
employer unfair labor practices.' 13 The difference between the two
countries, in Weiler's view, is the elimination of a lengthy representation
campaign in Canada.1 14 To bring about needed change in the United
States, Weiler recommended requiring a union to present to the NLRB
authorization cards from 55 or 60 percent of the workers and those
workers to pay to the union a token membership fee.' 15 The NLRB
would thereafter hold an election within about five days. Questions
concerning bargaining unit shape and inclusion would be decided after
the election." 6
On first-contract arbitration, Weiler drew from the Canadian model,
noting it would assist new unions in putting down roots in an enterprise,
and provide workers with a chance to experience work life lived under a
collective bargaining agreement." 7 Yet, though favoring this remedy,
he quickly backed away from it, noting he doubted its "practical
feasibility" in the United States."' 8 In contrast, Weiler argued forcefully
in favor of protecting the right to strike by legislatively overruling the
MacKay Radio permanent replacement doctrine.1 19 In place of that
doctrine, he suggested the approach of Ontario's labor law, which allows
strikers up to six months from the date of the strike to return to work
even if replacements are displaced.120
By the early 1990s, Weiler's work and ideas were known among
the leaders of organized labor in the United States. Writing in 1991,
Professor Hyde described Weiler's thinking as "quietly influential" and
noted that if American organized labor perceived the possibility of
legislative victory, their agenda would evidence Weiler's influence. 121
VII. CANADIAN INFLUENCE AND THE DUNLOP COMMISSION
A window of opportunity within which to address American labor's
agenda opened in 1992, with the election of President Bill Clinton and
the achievement of Democratic Party control of both the Senate and the
113. Id. at 255.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 255-56.
117. Id. at 250.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 264-68.
120. Id. at 268.
121. Hyde, supra note 77, at 456.
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House of Representatives. 122 In 1993, the Clinton administration created
the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, which
was chaired by John T. Dunlop, Professor Emeritus at Harvard, who had
also served as U.S. Secretary of Labor. 123 Professor Paul Weiler, then
Harvard's Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, served as counsel to the
Commission.124
The Commission, which came to be known as the Dunlop
Commission, was charged with reporting on three key questions,
including: "What (if any) changes should be made in the present legal
framework and practices of collective bargaining to enhance cooperative
behavior, improve productivity, and reduce conflict and delay?"1 2 5
To address that question, and two others, the Commission held
twenty-one public hearings, and reviewed "correspondence, studies and
articles from representatives of business groups, labor organizations,
professional associations, academics, women's organizations, civil rights
and other interested groups, and individuals." 12 6 After twenty months of
effort, the Commission concluded that the NLRA was not achieving its
central goals of promoting collective bargaining and protecting
employees' rights to choose unionization.12 7  In particular, the
Commission decried the importation into union representation
campaigns "of the worst features of political campaigns," which resulted
in hostility and confrontation among the parties.12 8 Also of concern was
the increase over time of discriminatory discharges of workers
exercising their rights under the NLRA.129 Finally, the Commission
found that in a third of the cases where employees opt to unionize, the
union is unable to successfully negotiate a first-contract with the
employer.130
In response to these findings, the Dunlop Commission
recommended three changes in U.S. labor law, two of which clearly bear
Weiler's Canadian-influenced thinking. First, the Commission
122. See Thomas A. Kochan, Updating American Labor Law: Taking Advantage ofa Window
of Opportunity, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 101, 104 (2007).
123. Robert B. Moberly, Labor-Management Relations during the Clinton Administration, 24
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 31, 47 (2006).
124. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMM'N ON FUTURE WORKER-
MGMT. RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT RELATIONS -
FINAL REPORT 112 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 9.
128. Id. at 36.
129. See id at 38.
130. See id. at 39.
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suggested that representation elections be held as quickly as
administratively feasible - ideally within two weeks - and before legal
hearings on bargaining unit scope.' 3  Although not as "instant" an
instant election as Weiler had suggested in Governing the Workplace,
holding elections within two weeks represented a significant
improvement over what then NLRB General Counsel Fred Feinstein
testified was the best he could manage under the system at the time: an
election within seven or eight weeks of a petition for election being
filed. 132 Interestingly, the Commission encouraged employers and labor
organizations to promote cooperation by eschewing an election entirely
and voluntarily agreeing to determine employees' preferences via card
check.133 Yet the final report did not go so far as to suggest card check
as a certification method that could be imposed upon a reluctant
employer.13 4
Second, the Commission recommended the government assist
employers and newly certified unions in obtaining first contracts by
providing early access to mediation and creating a tripartite first contract
advisory board.13 5 The latter would be able to draw from a range of
options to assist the parties, from encouraging them to work out their
differences through self-help (strikes or lockouts) to binding arbitration
in extreme cases.136  The Commission's statement on first contract
arbitration sounds a theme present in Weiler's scholarly work on the
subject:
Making arbitration available in first contract cases is crucial to the
overall representation system. The Commission believes it will be
necessary to invoke arbitration only rarely, but the prospect of its use
in situations where one side or the other has been recalcitrant in
negotiations will motivate the parties to reach mutually acceptable
137compromises.
In other words, the great utility of first contract arbitration is its
deterrent effect on parties who might otherwise delay the bargaining
process or act in bad faith.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 40-41.
133. See id. at 42.
134. See id. (noting the Commission encourages, rather than recommends, employer use of
card-check to "determine the employees' majority preference").
135. Id. at 45.
136. Id at 45.
137. Id. at 46.
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The Dunlop Commission did not address a third Weiler-identified
candidate for labor law reform: change of the MacKay Radio doctrine
permitting the permanent replacement of striking workers."' At the
time the Commission was at work, however, there was pending
legislation that would have banned hiring permanent replacements
during economic strikes. 139  Indeed, the Cesar Chavez Workplace
Fairness Act, organized labor's highest priority at the beginning of the
Clinton administration, died on the Senate floor in 1994.140 The Dunlop
Commission's recommendations met a similar fate. By the time the
final report was issued in December 1994, the Republicans' "Contract
with America" had enabled the party to seize control of the House of
Representatives. 14 1  Nonetheless, Canadian-inspired ideas had clearly
influenced labor law reform proposals and proposed legislation, and they
would again during the early days of the Obama administration.
VIII. THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT
A version of the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) has been
introduced in every Congress since 2003.142 The American union
movement's highest legislative priority1 4 3 has so far not been enacted.144
While EFCA, if adopted, would increase the remedies available for
unfair labor practices committed during an election campaign, two
elements have been most in contention. These two provisions track
recommendations first made by Professor Weiler in the early 1980s.
First, EFCA provides for card-check certification. 14 5  Under the
proposed legislation, a union that receives the support of a majority of
workers in a bargaining unit can be certified by the NLRB as the
138. See generally id.
139. See William R. Corbett, "The More Things Change,...": Reflections on the Stasis of
Labor Law in the United States, 56 VILL. L. REV. 227, 228 (2011).
140. Id. at 227-28.
141. Id.at231.
142 H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 800, 110th Cong.
(2007); S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1696, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 842, 109th Cong. (2005);
H.R. 3619, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1925, 108th Cong. (2003). See also JON 0. SHIMABUKURO,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21887, THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 1 (2011) [hereinafter CONG.
RESEARCH SERV].
143. See Dale Russakoff, Labor to Push Agenda in Congress It Helped Elect, WASH. POST,
Dec. 8, 2006, at A13. (quoting AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney as calling EFCA "the most
important work we'll be doing, because it's a key to succeeding on everything else.").
144. The EFCA follows equally unsuccessful attempts to enact legislation to amend the NLRA
to provide for expedited elections and/or card certification. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note
142, at 6-7.
145. See id at 1.
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exclusive bargaining representative without an election. 146  Second,
EFCA provides for first contract arbitration.147 If the parties engaged in
first contract negotiations fail to reach an agreement after 130 days,
interest arbitration would be available to them that would establish the
collective bargaining agreement for them.148 While such procedures are
not unknown to American public sector labor law,149 the primary
inspiration for EFCA is the Canadian experience and one of the primary
critiques of the proposed legislation is based on that experience." 0
Before the 2008 election, Senator Barack Obama announced his
support of EFCA.1'5 After his election as President, EFCA's business
opponents organized their opposition in a group called the Alliance to
Save Main Street Jobs.'5 2 The Alliance, which is led by the HR Policy
Association, includes as members the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
American Hotel and Lodging Association, the International Council of
Shopping Centers, the Real Estate Roundtable, the Retail Industry
Leaders Association, and the Associated Builders and Contractors.153
Financial support for the research, preparation and publication of at least
two scholarly critiques of EFCA was provided by the Alliance.154 One
critique was authored by Professor Richard Epstein, who argued for the
146. See id. In the face of fierce resistance to card-check certification, the Senate supporters of
EFCA dropped card check but replaced it with expedited, also a Canadian-inspired recommendation
made by Weiler in the 1980s. See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill To Assist
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, at Al.
147. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 142, at 3 ("In addition to providing for union
certification without an election, the EFCA would have amended the NLRA to allow for the
involvement of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS") during the negotiation of
an initial agreement following certification or the recognition of a labor organization."). See also
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 11 1" Cong. § 3 (2009).
148. H.R. 1409 § 3.
149. See generally William A. Herbert, Card Check Labor Certification: Lessons from New
York, 74 ALB. L. REV. 93 (2010) (discussing New York's fifty-year history with card check
certification).
150. That is not to say that U.S. labor law scholars did not critique EFCA without looking to
Canada. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the
Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 668-71 (2010) (outlining the critique that card
check impeded employee choice by exposing employees to coercive pressures from union
organizers).
151. See DEMOCRATIC NAT'L CONVENTION COMM., THE 2008 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
PLATFORM: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 14 (2008); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE
AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT vii (2009).
152. See EPSTEIN, supra note 151, at ix (stating that Epstein himself received financial support
from the Alliance to Save Main Street Jobs for writing this work critiquing the EFCA).
153. Id.
154. See id. (acknowledging financial support from the Alliance); Layne-Farrar, supra note 9,
at 1 ("Financial support from The Alliance to Save Main Street Jobs is gratefully acknowledged.").
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repeal the NLRA.'55  Epstein published an Alliance-funded book
critiquing the proposed legislation.'5 6 He attacked EFCA using a wide
range of arguments, but all were based on a domestic point of view.' In
other words, he did not look to conditions in Canada to support his
arguments. His only mention of Canada is his critique of Weiler, who
he describes as a "Harvard law professor and AFL-CIO board member
in both the United States and Canada."158 His criticism was of Weiler's
use of data in Promises to Keep dealing with the percentage of pro-union
employees discharged in union organizing drives in the United States.159
In contrast, the other Alliance funded scholarly critique of EFCA,
which apparently was only posted on the Social Science Research
Network (SSRN), relied on the Canadian experience to argue against the
proposed legislation.160  This critique was authored Dr. Anne Layne-
Farrar, an economist who identified herself as a director at LECG, a
consulting company.161 Layne-Farrar argued that "Canada offers a
natural experiment for quantitative analysis ... [and] a window on the
most likely effects of passing EFCA in the United States."1 62 This is
due, she claimed, to the provincial level changes in certification
procedures in Canada, and the similarities between the United States and
its northern neighbor in terms of "industrial structure," as well as the
economic integration of the two countries.163
Using Canadian data drawn from prior studies of card check
certification and mandatory first contract arbitration published in
Canada, Layne-Farrar concluded that "EFCA is unlikely to achieve its
primary goal of improving overall social welfare."l 64 While predicting
that EFCA would result in higher union density, she supported her
155. Professor Epstein's opposition to the NLRA is longstanding. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92
YALE L.J. 1357 (1983) (arguing that the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the Wagner Act of
1935 should be abolished in favor of a common law regime).
156. See generally EPsTEIN, supra note 151.
157. See generally id
158. Id. at 52.
159. Id. at 52 (citing Promises, supra note 75 at 1781).
160. See generally Layne-Farrar, supra note 9.
161. Id at 1 n.*. Layne-Farrar testified before Congress based on her study. See generally
Rebuilding Economic Security: Empowering Workers to Restore the Middle Class: Hearing of the
S. Comm. On Health, Educ., Labor, and Pension, 11lth Cong. 27-32(2009) (statement of Anne
Layne-Farrar, Ph.D., Director, LECG Consulting).
162. Layne-Farrar, supra note 9, at 3.
163. Id. at 15.
164. Id at 28. "[A] card check and mandatory arbitration system which raise union
membership ... would lead to a reduction in the US employment rate and a subsequent reduction in
US industry output." Id at 26.
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overall conclusion based on what she predicted would be the collateral
effects if the Act were to be enacted:
1. [H]igher union density today, is associated with higher
unemployment tomorrow and the effect is highly statistically
significant .... [I]f card checks and a mandatory contract arbitration
system were to increase union density by 5 percentage points . . . the
US unemployment rate is predicted to increase in the following year by
1.49 to 1.77 percentage points over current levels - an increase of 2.28
million to 2.71 million unemployed workers. If union density were to
increase by 10 percentage points . . . in the following year the US
unemployment rate would increase by 2.97 to 3.53 percentage points
over current levels - an increase of 4.56 million to 5.42 million
unemployed workers. 65
2. [I]f EFCA were to raise union density today by 5 percentage points,
the employment rate would decrease by 0.86 to 1.14 percentage points
next year, for a net loss of between 0.55 and 0.95 million jobs. If
EFCA were to raise the union density today by 10 percentage points,
the employment rate would decrease by 1.72 to 2.27 percentag points
next year, for a net loss of between 1.81 and 2.61 million jobs.
In short, Layne-Ferrar predicted sizeable adverse labor market
effects in the United States would be associated with adopting card
check certification and first contract arbitration, longtime aspects of
Canadian labor law.
The fact that Layne-Farrar's study was funded by an association of
U.S. business groups is not surprising. Nor is it remarkable that Layne-
Farrar's predictions were widely reported in the mainstream media, by
for example, CBS, MSNBC, The Wall Street Journal, and Fox News.167
One is similarly loath to express shock that Layne-Farrar testified before
Congress about her conclusions. Such is the state of American politics,
political lobbying, and media coverage. What is notable, however, is the
way Canadian scholars responded to Layne-Farrar's study. First, over
"100 Canadian university-based academics working in economics,
labour studies, labour or industrial relations, and other labour-related
disciplines" signed a statement claiming that "Canada's more extensive
165. Id. at 22-24.
166. Id. at 25.
167. Chris Kromm, Investigation: Business Bankrolls Study Claiming Job Losses from
Employee Free Choice Act, THE INST. FOR S. STUD. (Mar. 11, 2009, 2:50 PM),
http://www.sourthernstudies.org/2009/03/investigation-business-bankrolls-sutdy-claiming-job-
losses-from-employee-free-choice-act.htm.
22 [Vol. 30:1
HeinOnline  -- 30 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 22 2012
NORTH AMERICAN BORDER WARS
collective bargaining system has not undermined our aggregate labour
market performance, and in fact has had generally positive impacts on
economic and social well-being here." 68
Second, Canadian scholars joined together to demonstrate that
Layne-Farrar's study is fatally flawed. A special issue of the journal
Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society was devoted to
debunking Layne-Ferrar's thesis and the broader implications of her
work. 16 9 The special issue consists of nine articles and an extensive
bibliography of Canadian labor market research.170 These articles are
written by a number of Canada's leading scholars on the subject.
Divided into three sections, the special edition extensively interrogates
Layne-Ferrar's hypothesis, focuses on Qu6bec's long-term experience
with card check certification and first contract arbitration, and considers
the link, in Canada, between unionization and economic and social well-
being."n
In terms of the weaknesses in Layne-Farrar's methodology and
findings, two kinds of data were left out of her study. First, Layne-
Farrar relied on data from 1976 to 1997, even though more recent data
was available through 2007.172 Further, Layne-Farrar excluded from her
study significant variables, such as demographic changes, changes in
industrial structure, real or minimum wages, unemployment insurance,
and, most significantly, the substantial change in the rate of participation
of women. 173 Additionally, Layne-Farrar included inappropriate
estimations of variables that are "non-stationary," or, variables that
move in the same direction over time. 17 4 The problem with this is that
regressing variables that move over time can erroneously produce what
appears to be a causal link between them. 175  Under that approach,
"[u]nionization does a better job of explaining beer and cigarette prices,
than of explaining Canadian unemployment[.]"1 76  Sran and Stanford
reran the study, correcting for the deficiencies in Layne-Farrar's study
168. Pupo, supra note 10, at 2.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id
172. Johnson, supra note 11, at 21.
173. See id.; Pierre Fortin, Faulty Methodology Generates Faulty Results, 15 JUST LAB.: A
CANADIAN J. OF WORK & SOC'Y (SPECIAL EDITION) 26, 27 (2009); Garry Sran & Jim Stanford,
Further Tests of the Link Between Unionization, Unemployment and Employment: Findings from
Canadian National and Provincial Data, 15 JUST LAB.: CANADIAN J. OF WORK & SOC'Y (SPECIAL
EDITION) 29, 31 (2009).
174. Sran & Stanford, supra note 173, at 30.
175. Id. at 36.
176. Id. at 37.
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and they concluded that:
After correctly specifying the econometric methodology (in particular,
by ensuring that included variables do not exhibit secular trends over
time), and considering the impact of all determinants of unemployment
and employment performance (in the Canadian case by including
variables reflecting monetary policy, exchange rate and terms of trade
issues, commodity prices, and demographic trends), there is no
statistically significant relationship visible, in either direction, between
unionization and either unemployment rates or employment rates in
Canada. Unionization is not a significant determinant of aggregate
Canadian labour market performance. 77
Moreover, some of the scholars attempted to take the air out of
inflated claims that EFCA would result in greatly elevated union density.
Professors Sara Slinn and Richard Hurd, using a framework that
measures the relationship between union organizing activity and private
sector union density, predict that, even assuming a twenty percent
increase in U.S. union organizing activity, "the model forecasts only
modest growth in [U.S.] private sector union density to approximately
8%.",178 Still other scholars sought to demonstrate the potential
beneficial effects of EFCA. For example, one study looked at the
relationship between requiring an election, which a number of Canadian
provinces do, and the effectiveness of employer unfair labor practices in
comparison with card check jurisdictions. "[E]mployer unfair labour
practices have been shown to be twice as effective at discouraging
unionization where certification votes are required."179
Apparently, there has been no rebuttal to the critiques of the
Canadian scholars by Layne-Farrar. 8 0  That may be because the
opponents of EFCA have won. With the election of Scott Brown to the
Senate in January 2010, and the subsequent gains for the Republicans in
the Senate in the regular 2010 election, EFCA seems to be dead for now.
The very effective response of the Canadian scholars to Layne-Farrar's
177. Id. at 59-60.
178. See Sara Slinn & Richard W. Hurd, Fairness and Opportunity for Choice: The Employee
Free Choice Act & the Canadian Model, 15 JUST LAB.: CANADIAN J. OF WORK & Soc'Y (SPECIAL
EDITION) 104, 110 (2009).
179. John Godard, Joseph B. Rose & Sara Slinn, Should Congress Pass the Employee Free
Choice Act? Some Neighborly Advice, 15 JUST LAB.: CANADIAN J. OF WORK & Soc'Y (SPECIAL
EDITION) 116, 118 (2009).
180. Her curriculum vitae, dated May, 2012, does not list either an article or a work-in-
progress responding to her critics. See Anne S. Layne-Farrar, COMPASS LEXECON (May 2012),
http://www.compasslexecon.com/professionals/Documents/Anne%20Layne-Farrar%/*2OCV.pdf.
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paper has not so far been able to overcome its negative impact when she
first posted her work on SSRN, which was then cited in numerous press
releases by interest groups opposed to EFCA's enactment and also
covered by the American media. But this observation begs an important
question: What accounts for the Canadian response? An attempt at
answering that question will be provided below.
IX. CONCLUSION
Understanding the motivation of the Canadian scholars, whose
work ably debunked Layne-Farrar's thesis, may require returning to the
work of Paul Weiler, particularly his seminal article, Promises to Keep.
In explaining why employers should have no right to extensive
commentary in union organizing campaigns, Weiler drew an analogy to
the interest Canada has in elections in the United States.s18  Surely, he
noted, American political elections are consequential for Canada insofar
as their outcomes will impact relations between the two countries.' 82 But
no one assumes that Canadians should participate in U.S. election
campaigns "in order to try to persuade United States citizens to vote for
a party that would be favorable to Canadian interests."'8 3
Similarly, one should not assume that the Canadian scholars were
attempting primarily to affect the outcome of the debate over EFCA.
While certainly they may have had some sense of solidarity with the
American supporters of EFCA, their response is best understood as an
attempt to prevent spillover effects from the EFCA debate that might
undermine the Canadian model by misrepresenting its labor market
outcomes.184 Since Canada's labor laws are sensitive to political change,
Layne-Farrar's work represented a significant threat - or at least a risk
that needed to be neutralized quickly.'85 Setting the record straight was
a strategic maneuver meant to safeguard the Canadian approach from
business interests, Canadian and American, intent upon initiating greater
181. Promises, supra note 75, at 1814.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Pupo, supra note 10, at 1 (outlining the Canadian interest in the outcome of the
American EFCA debate).
185. Business-friendly labor law reforms in Ontario in the 1990s, for example, were driven by
discussions of the need to attract foreign investment. See Brian A. Langille, Global Competition
and Canadian Labor Law Reform: Rhetoric and Reality, in GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT LANDSCAPE: As WE ENTER THE 21ST CENTURY 630-36 (Samuel
Estreicher ed., 2000). Layne-Farrar's study, if unchallenged, might have become a vehicle for
business-friendly labor law reforms.
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convergence of the Canadian regime to the U.S. model. 186 The irony, of
course, is that two sides with significantly different ideological outlooks
(American EFCA opponents and Canadian labor market scholars
favoring an EFCA-like approach) both have acted through scholarly
work to reinforce the divergence between the two labor law systems that
make up what Professor Marco Biagi called the "North American
Model."187 Thus, while Canadian ideas, especially those advocated by
Paul Weiler, have profoundly affected U.S. labor law reform proposals
over the last two decades, scholarly work surrounding at least the most
current debate may have contributed to the divergent paths of Canadian
and U.S. labor law.
186. Pupo, supra note 10, at 2-3. Relatedly, Professor Harry Arthurs worries about the effects
on all aspects of Canadian life - cultural, economic, legal, and intellectual - wrought by greater
North American regional integration, especially the increasing domination by American corporate
headquarters of the Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. transnational corporations. See H.W. Arthurs,
Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of Legal Fields, 12 CANADIAN J.
OF LAW & Soc'y 219,225-27,233 (1997).
187. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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